A FAQ on Depleted Uranium :
A Shame for the so called Civilized World

A FAQ on Depleted Uranium

Q. What is depleted uranium?

A. Depleted uranium is the by-product of the process for converting ("enriching") natural uranium for use as nuclear fuel or nuclear weapons. Depleted uranium is approximately 40 percent less radioactive than natural uranium. The depleted uranium used in armor-piercing munitions is also widely used in civilian industry, primarily for stabilizers in airplanes and boats.

Q. What makes depleted uranium a potential hazard?

A. Depleted uranium is a heavy metal that is also slightly radioactive. Heavy metals (uranium, lead, tungsten, etc.) have chemical toxicity properties that, in high doses, can cause poisoning and health effects.

A common misconception is that depleted uranium's primary hazard is radiological. This is not the case under most battlefield exposure scenarios. Depleted uranium emits alpha and beta particles, and gamma rays. Alpha particles, the primary radiation type produced by depleted uranium, are blocked by skin; while beta particles are blocked by the boots and battle dress utility uniform (BDUs) typically worn by service members. While gamma rays are pure energy and are highly penetrating, the amount of gamma radiation emitted by depleted uranium is extremely low.

The 120mm sabot rounds fired from the main guns of U.S. Abrams series tanks figure prominently in most of the depleted uranium exposure scenarios and incidents investigated to date. The round uses a 10.7 lb. depleted uranium penetrator that is approximately 18 inches long and 1.5 inches thick. When fired, or after "cooking off" in fires or explosions, the depleted uranium rod, now unshielded, or exposed, poses an extremely low radiological threat as long as it remains outside the body. Internalized in sufficient quantity, however, via metal fragments or dust-like particles and oxides, depleted uranium may pose a long-term health hazard to personnel. However, the medical significance of a specific exposure scenario is dependent on a number of factors, including particle size distribution and solubility as well as the amount of depleted uranium taken into the body.

Q. Were any studies on the health effects of depleted uranium ever conducted prior to the onset of the Gulf War? What were the findings of those studies?

A. The toxicity of uranium has been studied extensively. The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry just recently published a Draft Toxicological Profile for uranium, an update to the original profile published in May 1989. The health effects of uranium were well established before the Gulf War. It is primarily a heavy metal, chemical toxicity concern, and not a radiological hazard.

The environmental effects of depleted uranium have been studied comprehensively by a wide range of governmental and non-governmental bodies both before and after the Gulf War. Burn tests and other evaluations performed under simulated battlefield conditions indicated that the health risk factors associated with the battlefield use of depleted uranium were minimal and in most cases could be prevented or lessened by simple, field-expedient measures, especially, avoidance of depleted uranium-contaminated vehicles and sites. Unfortunately, troop awareness of the hazards posed by battlefield depleted uranium contamination was generally low. As a result, many personnel did not practice field-expedient measures that would have prevented or mitigated possible exposures.

The two main areas that were not adequately addressed before the Gulf War were:

the medical implications of embedded fragments and
live fire exposure estimates for friendly fire incidents, recovery activities, and incidental contact scenarios.
These are weaknesses that have been recognized and we are attempting to address.

Q. What has the Defense Department done to protect future generations of service members from accidental exposure to depleted uranium?

A. The Department of Defense is fully aware of its overarching responsibility for the use of depleted uranium. Since the Gulf War, the DoD has dramatically stepped up its emphasis on increasing soldier and leader awareness of the hazards associated with the battlefield use of depleted uranium use. The US Army's Training and Doctrine Command published Training Support Packages for respective training schools in September 1997. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has ordered the Service Chiefs to ensure that the hazards associated with depleted uranium are incorporated into the general military training program. Full implementation of the various training programs will be underway during the summer of 1998. The Office of the Special Assistant will continue to monitor the status of the Services' depleted uranium training efforts.

Q. In what way has the DoD attempted to track the service members exposed to depleted uranium during the Gulf War?

A. We have categorized the exposure scenarios into three levels based on their relative exposures. Level I is the highest exposure group, with an estimated 113 soldiers who were in or near combat vehicles at the time they were struck by depleted uranium rounds, and an estimated 30 to 60 troops who entered these vehicles immediately afterwards to perform combat rescue. Depleted uranium metal fragments struck a number of soldiers, and some of these still retain embedded depleted uranium fragments. Others inhaled or ingested depleted uranium particles, or had depleted uranium contaminate their wounds. The U.S. Army's Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine preliminary estimate of worst case exposures, based on test data and a "worst case" assumption (depleted uranium rounds impacting and penetrating the depleted uranium armor of an Abram's "heavy armor" model tank), is that the estimated radiation exposure is about the same dose a person would get from living in the United States for four years. Thirty-three of these friendly fire victims are already enrolled in a health assessment program with the VA. About half of these veterans still carry depleted uranium fragments in their bodies.

Level II exposures comprise around two hundred soldiers who worked in and around combat vehicles (mainly US friendly fire vehicles) struck by depleted uranium – in addition to as many as 600 personnel who took part in the clean up after the fire at Camp Doha. These exposures probably resulted in significantly less intakes of depleted uranium than the Level I exposures, but caution dictates that we evaluate the exposures of individuals in this category. To date, we have identified and categorized several hundred personnel as Level II exposures based on their involvement in the activities described above.

Level III is an "all others" category for personnel whose contacts with depleted uranium were very brief and are highly unlikely to have resulted in any medically significant exposure taking place. This group includes curious troops who entered Iraqi equipment or personnel down wind from vehicles that burned after being struck by depleted uranium rounds. Based on existing research, we believe this group received minimal exposures. Although we have no plans to identify and contact persons in the Level III category, veterans who are concerned about possible depleted uranium exposures or their health care providers can request an evaluation from a DoD or Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) facility, as appropriate.

Q. Why did it take OSAGWI so long to publish this document?

A. As with all of the information papers, case narratives and exposure reports produced by our investigative teams, extreme care is taken to ensure only sustainable facts surrounding events that occurred during the Gulf War are presented to the reader. In the case of the depleted uranium report, hundreds of veterans were interviewed in order to reconstruct numerous military operations and to document possible exposure to depleted uranium. This process takes time. Additionally, in our efforts to be as accurate as possible, each publication is reviewed by other members of the Gulf War illness team and, once approved by them, is sent out for external review. In the case of the depleted uranium investigation, we underwent several rewrites of the report before allowing it to be sent for external review by recognized experts in the field. This process, while time consuming, ensures that the publication includes all the available information on the subject.

Q. What are the health effects of contact with unfired depleted uranium armor or unperforated(intact) munitions on the various weapons systems, such as the Abrams Heavy Tank?

A: Unfired depleted uranium munitions are encased in thin metal jackets that seal in alpha and beta particles, and allow only extremely slight gamma emissions which fall well below regulatory health and safety limits. Similarly, depleted uranium panels used in tank armor pose no real health risk because the depleted uranium is sealed inside several inches of regular steel armor. Alpha radiation, which is the major concern for internalized depleted uranium, is not an external concern because alpha radiation does not penetrate the outer layers of skin. While it is impossible to evaluate all potential exposure scenarios, each of the major weapon systems have been fully evaluated and all of the routine exposures are well below exposure guidelines. The depleted uranium in the Abrams Heavy Tank armor is sandwiched between layers of steel that effectively attenuate radiation from the depleted uranium armor. In fact, radiation levels measured inside the turret are below background levels measured outside the turret from cosmic radiation. Theoretically, these crewmembers have their radiation exposure reduced by working inside the tank.

The second source of radiation is from the depleted uranium rounds stored on board the tank. While soldiers are exposed to increased level of radiation from the stored munitions, the cumulative exposure levels are within applicable guidelines. Since depleted uranium munitions are only used in combat, only forward-deployed vehicles are routinely uploaded with depleted uranium munitions.

The most frequently cited example of radiation exposure is holding a bare penetrator rod, which is impossible, as long as any of the rounds are intact. The penetrator rod in the 120-mm, 105 mm and 30 mm rounds is shielded which prevents direct contact with the actual penetrator rod. But even when holding a bare penetrator rod, an individual could hold the rod for 250 hours before reaching the extremity or skin limit of 50 rem. Contrary to some claims, the appropriate criteria is 50 rem because the exposure is to the extremity (hand) or to the skin and not to the whole body.